

**ER files**

ER Report #6

FINAL REPORT OF WORKING GROUP  
ON ORGANIZATION AND ACTIVITIES

Copy No. 4

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6 April 1962

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MEMORANDUM FOR: Director of Central Intelligence

SUBJECT : Final Report of Working Group on Organization and Activities

1. I have the honor to present herewith the final report of the working group which you established in January to consult with you and advise on the organization and activities of the Central Intelligence Agency, and of its relationship with other agencies in the intelligence community. This report reflects the views of the working group and is divided into two parts. The first part deals primarily with the organization of the Central Intelligence Agency and reflects the unanimous views of the working group. The second part contains comments and recommendations on areas dealing with the work of the Central Intelligence Agency and activities of the intelligence community in which the working group was either unable to agree or felt that considerably more study was needed before action was taken.

2. For the record I would note that the working group held its first session on January 3 and met on 35 different days between that date and its final session with you on March 28. During its work the group had approximately 100 briefings. Most of these briefings dealt with the organization and activities of the Central Intelligence Agency, but also included a full day spent with the Department of State in addition to several briefings on State Department activities and its relations with CIA; approximately one-half day spent in the Pentagon in addition to other briefings by the Defense Intelligence Agency; and a full week spent visiting SAC, NORAD and other activities in the United States. We were briefed by the head of every major component in the CIA with the exception of three DD/P area divisions whose briefings had to be excluded because of the pressure of time. However, we feel that having heard from four other area divisions the working group had a knowledge of the activities and problems of these units. In addition to the 100 briefings, the working group had more than ten executive sessions in which it discussed and debated at great length its findings and conclusions. Finally, there were

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some 20 meetings with yourself, and with senior Agency officials to discuss our findings and conclusions. These included at least two sessions with each of the Deputy Directors and with the Assistant Director for National Estimates and the Assistant Director for Current Intelligence.

3. The attached report does not purport to be complete or exhaustive in any respect, but rather it is an aide memoir to recall to mind our oral discussions and to record some of the reasons and philosophy behind our recommendations.

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/Lyman B. Kirkpatrick

cc: DDCI

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EP 62-2169 Att.

PART I

This section deals primarily with the organization of the Central Intelligence Agency and represents the view of the entire Working Group.

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OFFICE OF THE DCI

Organization of DCI's Office

We recommend that the organization of the DCI's office be changed in order to provide more effective support to the DCI, a systematized control of messages both oral and written, and a clear delineation of the responsibilities of the assistants to the DCI. In this connection we would urge that a secretariat be created, that the head of this secretariat assign individual responsibilities to each of the personal assistants to the DCI, that daily staff meetings be held for a full exchange on the activities of the staff, and that all personnel in the Agency be advised as to how to keep the DCI's staff informed properly of the activities of the Agency.

Comptroller

We recommend that the Comptroller's office be brought out from under the DD/S, report directly to the DCI's office and receive full authority for total fiscal control of the Agency.

We recommend that the Comptroller be designated Chairman of a Financial Policy and Budget Committee composed of the appropriate senior officers of the Agency. We believe that

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such a committee should be kept fully and currently informed of all Agency activities, and in order to be effective should meet regularly and submit its reports to the DDCI and DCI.

#### Inspector General

We recommend that the Audit Staff be combined with the staff of the Inspector General and that the merged staff report to the DCI's office.

We believe that the size of the Inspector General Staff should be increased with qualified professional personnel assigned from their respective components in order to perform more frequent inspections of Agency units. We urge inspections at least annually of major operations and of field stations.

#### General Counsel

We recommend that the General Counsel's staff be removed from the organization of the Deputy Director (Support) and report directly to the office of the DCI. In such a position the General Counsel should resume the responsibility for the direction and guidance of the work of the Legislative Counsel, which is currently the responsibility of the Inspector General.

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### Cable Secretariat

We have examined the Cable Secretariat which is currently located in the office of the DCI and reports to the Executive Officer. We believe it should continue to be in the office of the Director under the careful supervision of the Executive Director. We are concerned that as it now operates requirements for cables have not been adequately coordinated, and cables have been disseminated too often on the judgment of junior officers. We believe this needs careful study.

### Contracts

We believe that the Agency is vulnerable on sole-source contracts for such activities as TSD and DPD, and that those contracts currently in existence should be reviewed and that all such future contracts should be passed on by the DCI's office prior to approval.

### Personnel Assignments

We believe that the DDCI and DCI should be the final approving authority for all assignments to positions of Chief or Deputy Chief of Offices (DD/P Divisions and Staffs) or of



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We believe the DCI's office should also review all assignments in the middle management echelon with particular reference to insuring the proper language qualifications, operational training and suitability.

#### Public Relations

We recommend that the present system of public relations by the Agency be changed. While we see the necessity for the DCI to have an assistant in his office handling relations with the public media, we believe that every effort should be made to minimize the amount of publicity that CIA receives.

We strongly recommend that the present practice of giving background briefings to newspapermen cease and that CIA give information to the press only where CIA has something which for operational reasons should be released on an unattributable basis. We urge that no public speeches be given by Agency officials.

#### Reduction in Force

We recommend that the DCI and DDCI insure that the present reduction in force in the Agency include senior officers, particularly supergrades who are no longer as effective as they should be in their assignments.

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### Handling of Communications Other Than Cables

We note that under present arrangements communications other than cables are handled by the Records Integration Division of DD/P, which is not always fully cognizant of the interests of non-DD/P parts of the Agency. We recommend that the entire system of handling incoming and outgoing communications be subjected to further study with a view to insuring adequate dissemination of all communications, particularly in DD/I, DD/R and DD/S, which may have need for prompt receipt of such material.

### Executive Director

We have not tried to spell out the responsibilities of the Executive Director, inasmuch as we believe this to be primarily a matter that should be tailored to the personal preferences of the DCI and DDCI and how they wish to operate their office and the Agency. We urge, however, that special attention be directed to the avoidance of a straight vertical line of command; i. e., all problems should not have to pass through each of the three officers.

### Executive Committee

We recommend the creation of an Executive Committee to be chaired by the DDCI and consist of the four Deputies, the

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Comptroller, and the Assistant to the DCI for Coordination and Intelligence Community Guidance. This Committee, from a policy standpoint, would review proposed major projects and maintain a continuous review of all major activities and make appropriate recommendations thereon to the DCI. This Committee would replace the present Project Review Committee.

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ORGANIZATION AND ACTIVITIES OF THE  
DEPUTY DIRECTOR (PLANS)

Office of the DD/P

We commend the decision of the DD/P to abolish the position of the A/DDP/A, and believe that the restoration of the previous organization with just the DD/P and COP in the line of command in the front office will result in a clear delineation of responsibilities and more efficient operations.

The Staffs

We studied at some length the staffs in the DD/P. We considered a possible merger of the FI, CI and CA staffs. We also studied proposals for divesting the staffs of all operational responsibilities. We believe that while both are desirable objectives, neither are practicable under present circumstances. We therefore urge that the FI, CI and CA staff functions be drawn closer together under the Chief of Operations and that these organizations insofar as practical act in the classical sense as staffs for the DD/P. We



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Merger of Covert Action Staff and International Organizations Division

The DD/P has advised us of his desire to merge the Covert Action Staff with the International Organizations Division. While this is contrary to the trend of divesting staffs of operational duties, we nevertheless do not observe any major reasons against such a merger and believe that it should be tried out in accordance with the DD/P's wishes.

Central Support Staff

We recommend that the DD/P draw together into a Central Support Staff control of personnel and other support matters currently decentralized to the divisions and staffs in order to locate these functions directly under him.

Special Task Force Operations

We recommend the creation of an organizational entity to be known as "Special Task Force Operations" reporting directly to the DD/P, which shall be activated and deactivated upon need, and which shall be the command mechanism for handling such projects as the Cuban operation which demands the creation of an organization from Agency-wide assets.

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Liaison with Department of State

We urge that the DD/P centralize liaison with the Department of State and maintain careful records of all discussions between the Agency and State Department officials. We note that nearly every area division chief has a weekly meeting with his counterpart in the Department but that under the present system there is no organized method for keeping the central management of the DD/P informed of what takes place at these meetings.

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ORGANIZATION AND ACTIVITIES OF THE  
DEPUTY DIRECTOR (INTELLIGENCE)

Office of the DD/I

We have carefully reviewed the organization and activities of the DD/I's immediate office and believe that with the addition of a full time deputy he will be able to assert the degree of influence on the management of the units under him required for sound operations. At present his three office assistants provide good staff work in this review, but we did observe that a considerable amount of the intelligence produced in the DD/I area is reviewed at no higher a level than office chief, if that.

We recommend that the DD/I establish in his office a focal point through which all intelligence, processed or unevaluated, going to the White House must flow. If for reasons of urgency a report is sent to the White House prior to evaluation, we recommend that a special notice to the effect that it is unevaluated be attached to the report and that an evaluation follow the report at the earliest possible moment.

Board of National Estimates

The Office of National Estimates should be strengthened by the addition of one top-level foreign affairs expert to the Board of Estimates, and if obtainable a top-level scientist and a top-level economist. We also believe that the Board would benefit by the

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
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addition of an individual experienced in business in the international field, provided one of sufficient caliber could be found who would be willing to spend two or three years on the Board of Estimates.

Control of Estimates

We urge that the DCI utilize the USIB to control the scheduling and to limit the number of National Estimates.

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ORGANIZATION AND ACTIVITIES OF THE  
DEPUTY DIRECTOR (SUPPORT)

Security Office

We recommend that the burden on the Security Office for support of the DD/P be reviewed (see DD/P section). In the meantime, we believe that a careful look at the Security Office is necessary to insure that the volume of work it is carrying is not in any way jeopardizing its primary responsibility of insuring that every possible measure is taken to keep the Agency secure.

We recommend that all security clearances be centralized under the Office of Security; e.g., clearances that are issued by DPD, OCI, NPIC, and other Agency components. While we would leave the policy of granting clearances with the appropriate officials, we believe that the Office of Security should maintain a centralized index for special clearances and do all of the processing of these clearances.

Audit Staff

We recommend that the Inspection and Audit Staff check regularly on activities in the  which are of vital concern to the Agency.

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DPD Support

We recommend that the DD/S be given the responsibility for support to all projects under the control of DD/R, providing of course the necessary security safeguards, and that in the future no parallel support mechanism be developed in the Agency.

Automatic Data Processing

We believe the Automatic Data Processing Staff can properly remain under the DD/S inasmuch as this is a support mechanism, although we strongly recommend that the DD/S in consultation with other deputies concerned direct this staff to aggressively pursue the objective of automation in the Agency in such a way as to insure the ultimate compatability of automatic data processing systems throughout the intelligence community.

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ORGANIZATION AND ACTIVITIES OF THE  
DEPUTY DIRECTOR (RESEARCH)

The Office of the Deputy Director (Research) having already been created, we now make the following recommendations as to those units which should be included under this Deputy.

Development Projects Division - Special Projects Branch

We recommend that the Special Projects Branch of DPD plus the necessary supporting elements, including those projects supporting the Department of Defense in advance reconnaissance programs, be placed under DD/R.

Technical Services Division

We recommend that all TSD research and development be placed under DD/R.

Other Research and Development

We recommend that the extent to which research and development for SIGINT collection equipment, including agents' SIGINT equipment, air-borne collection, etc., should be transferred to DD/R, be left as a matter for negotiation and agreement between DD/I and the Director of Communications.

We recommend all research and development in support of NPIC be transferred to DD/R.

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PART II

This section contains comments and recommendations on areas of the work of the Central Intelligence Agency and activities of the intelligence community in which the working group was either unable to agree, or felt that considerably more study was needed before action is taken. These views are presented herewith so that they may assist and guide those who may be asked to pursue these matters further.

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Coordination

We note your intention to abolish the present office of the Assistant for Coordination and to create in its stead an Assistant to DCI for Coordination and Intelligence Community Guidance. With the exception of Mr. Coyne, we are fully in accord. We set forth below our concept of the principal functions of this Assistant.

- a. He should be the DCI's principal advisor on coordination matters within the community and his personal representative in dealing on such matters with top officials of the community.
- b. When so directed he should represent the DCI in negotiations and discussions on intelligence matters with appropriate officials of foreign governments.
- c. He should be responsible for development of Comint and Elint policy insofar as this is an Agency function.
- d. He should keep continually under review the general extent and direction of the intelligence efforts of the community to insure that such efforts fully and effectively support national policy, submitting reports and recommendations to DCI as appropriate.
- e. He should correspondingly maintain a continuing review of activities and efforts of the Agency to insure that they remain fully and effectively coordinated with the activities and efforts of other members of the community.

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We do not consider it practicable at this time to suggest the number or qualifications of supporting staff officers for this Assistant. We feel, however, that he will need a group of such officers and that they should be of particularly high caliber and broad experience. The functions we visualize for this office are highly important for the community and for CIA. They have not been adequately handled in the past. The Assistant should be given whatever staff the full development of his role may later require.

Mr. Coyne does not concur in this recommendation. He disagrees with (a) the proposed organizational placement and title of the recommended office, because this would perpetuate the present ineffective arrangement of the Coordination Office now in existence and would not provide the recommended office with the stature required to assist the DCI in fulfilling his heavy responsibilities throughout the Intelligence Community; (b) the limitations in the functional concepts of the office, as outlined above. Further, he does not concur in this recommendation because it does not distinguish sufficiently the internal CIA operating functions of the DDCI from the community-wide functions which the recommended office must perform if the DCI is to execute effectively his principal mission as assigned in the President's Directive of January 16, 1962. Mr. Coyne believes


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that if the office is established along the lines recommended above, it will be incapable of effectively assisting the DCI in performing his principal Presidentially-assigned responsibilities of (a) coordinating and effectively guiding the total U. S. foreign intelligence effort; (b) establishing necessary policies and procedures to assure adequate coordination of foreign intelligence activities at all levels; (c) maintaining a continuing review, with the heads of the Departments and Agencies concerned, of the programs and activities of all U. S. agencies engaged in foreign intelligence activities; and (d) assuring efficiency and effectiveness, and avoiding undesirable duplication in the total foreign intelligence effort. Mr. Coyne will submit his recommendations on this subject at a later date.



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National Photographic Interpretation Center

We are concerned about the capability of NPIC to handle what may be a greatly increased volume of work in coming months. We

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recommend that as a matter of priority the USIB have this matter reviewed and insure that any increased flow of raw material does not result in slowing down the prompt and complete processing so urgently required.

Caliber of Personnel

We believe that the DD/I should devote some considerable effort to improving the caliber of personnel in his offices. Although we did not make a study in depth, we believe that there is a serious problem in this regard in OCI and that steps should be taken under the new management of OCI to improve the caliber of supervisory personnel and thus improve the morale of that office.

Merger of ONE and OCI

We studied at some length the feasibility of merging the Office of National Estimates with the Office of Current Intelligence. We found the Office of Current Intelligence eager for a merger, the Office of National Estimates strongly opposed. The DD/I was inclined to favor it, but foresees certain personnel difficulties. We do not believe that such a merger would be wise unless it was well established that the result would be the creation of better national estimates and current intelligence dailies and weeklies. The DD/I feels that

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he should be given at least sixty days to explore this proposal and to prepare his recommendations. We concur.

Mr. Coyne does not agree with the above paragraph and in lieu thereof recommends that the ONE and OCI be merged now. He believes that such merger will result in improved intelligence products to support the national policy makers.

Preparation and Dissemination of Memoranda

We have noted considerable unhappiness in the Department of State because ONE and OCI have established the practice of distributing throughout the community, and to the White House, uncoordinated memoranda on intelligence matters. These memoranda are prepared as "think pieces", but the Department of State feels that they often seem to influence policy at high levels. We think the Department of State has a point, and we urge that such memoranda be carefully restricted to circulation within the Agency unless or until they have been coordinated across-the-board.

We also urge that the DCI adopt the practice of asking other agencies to prepare such memoranda if the subjects fall within the purview of their responsibilities; e. g., the Department of State on strictly political matters. We believe that, at a minimum, when CIA is asked for a memorandum that inquiries should be made of

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other departments to determine whether such a memorandum hasn't already been prepared or might be in the process of preparation.

#### White House Relations

We are concerned about Agency relationships with the White House insofar as handling of intelligence matters is concerned. We would like the opportunity to discuss this with you orally before framing recommendations.

#### Research on International Communism

We are concerned about the reported inadequacy of research done on International Communism. At the present time some is done in the DD/I area in both OCI and ONE, some is done in the DD/P area in the International Communism Division of the Counter Intelligence Staff, and some is done in the State Department in the Special Studies Group of INR. The DD/I expressed himself as believing this was sufficiently covered. The Chief, CI Staff believes it is insufficiently covered. Representatives of the Department of State urged that greater expertise be brought to bear on the subject. Inasmuch as it will fall squarely on the shoulders of the DCI if not enough is being done, we urge that the matter be reviewed by the DCI at an early date to satisfy himself that all necessary research in this field is being accomplished.

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Office of Scientific Intelligence

On the new chart we have shown OSI as a division under DD/R since we understand this to be your desire. We feel, however, that OSI in its major activities is more closely linked to DD/I than to DD/R and therefore more properly belongs under DD/I. DD/I himself strongly supports this view and urges that he retain OSI. We believe that if this is approved, scientists in OSI should be members of DD/R's career service, subject to transfer between OSI and units of DD/R as might be agreed between the deputy directors concerned.

DD/R's Operational Responsibilities

We have some concern relative to your intention to have DD/R carry into the operational phase his responsibility for certain major projects involving complex and coordinated operations which are highly sensitive and where a mis-step could have serious national or international repercussions. DD/R's key people will be mostly scientists, technological experts or leaders in specialized development fields. Such individuals on the average have no professional intelligence operating experience and little background or interest in detailed operational problems requiring thorough inter-agency coordination, painstaking and tedious follow-up actions and careful attention to security details. DD/P, on the other hand, has a number

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of top-flight people who for some years have dealt almost exclusively with just such problems.

We recognize all the difficulty, in the course of a project of this type, of shifting responsibility from one deputy to the other; and we realize that development must also lap over into the operational phase. We suggest having as a general rule (but granting that exceptions will arise) that when operation begins the responsibility for the operations should be the DD/P's, but that DD/R should retain his responsibility for seeing that the equipment he has developed continues to function properly. There is here attached a specially classified annex. (OXC 3326 - filed in Executive Registry)  
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ORGANIZATION AND ACTIVITIES OF THE  
INTELLIGENCE COMMUNITY

National Indications Center - Watch Committee

We have examined quite carefully the National Indications Center, its organization, its capacity to support fully the Watch Committee, and its relations with other departments and agencies. We note that opinions within the community concerning NIC and its functions vary widely -- from the feeling that it should be abolished, or combined with DIA indications center -- to the belief that it is entirely satisfactory in its present situation. We do not fully subscribe to either of these views.

The functions of the Watch Committee, and NIC, with their terms of reference, were developed prior to the time when DIA was created. Now DIA has developed a strong capability to provide both early warning and indications of approaching crises to the community. Its capacity in this regard will develop even further in the months ahead.

We are aware that USIB is now considering the Fitch Committee Report. But we doubt that few if any members of that Committee were intimately aware of the full capacity of DIA and of its future plans. We note that General Carroll was reluctant to be drawn into the Committee's deliberations.

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We recommend, therefore, that except as noted below, NIC operations be allowed to continue as they are for the next three or four months. At that time we recommend a thorough review of the Watch Committee and NIC operations, particularly in the light of DIA's capabilities and activities, with a view to redefining the responsibilities and functions of NIC as may then appear desirable.

Mr. Coyne disagrees and recommends that the NIC be abolished now, and that the DIA be assigned the national strategic warning function and that its personnel complement be enlarged to include representation from appropriate members of USIB. Mr. Coyne points to reasons outlined in his memorandum to the DCI dated February 5, 1962.

We do believe that the National Indications Center should be properly manned and should receive both the high caliber of personnel at the proper grade and the number of personnel to perform its function promptly and efficiently. In this connection the Department of State has no representatives at NIC at present and the DCI should ask the Secretary to remedy this situation immediately.

We would suggest a change in the present method of preparing the Watch Committee report. If NIC is adequately manned, we see no reason why it should not draft, 24 hours in advance, the weekly

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
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Watch Committee report, circulate it to all agencies for consideration prior to discussion at the Watch Committee meeting when it could be decided upon in final form and reproduced and disseminated.

Related to the Watch Committee -- but also an important aspect of all coordinated intelligence community reports -- we believe that substantive disagreements should be encouraged and even spelled out in Watch Committee reports; that NIEs and SNIEs rather than being suppressed or covered by watered down language as is sometimes the case today, in all cases should reflect the consensus of views of the intelligence community. If there are differing minority views on the part of one or more agencies, including CIA, these should be spelled out in appropriate footnotes.

#### CIA Relations with the Department of State

We examined the relations of CIA with the Department of State. Several matters of concern in this area are mentioned in the section on the DD/P.



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State's Operational Center

x We reviewed with some interest the embryonic operational center which the Department of State is developing. We found that this is an interesting development and would obviously have bearing on the intelligence community.

State at White House Briefings

We recommend that in accordance with the present practice of a representative of the Defense Intelligence Agency attending the briefings of the White House staff by CIA, that a representative of the Department of State also be invited to attend these meetings.

C Receipt of Top Classification Messages

We recommend that the DCI take up directly with the President the problem of receiving all pertinent messages dealing with foreign affairs which might have any bearing on intelligence estimates or reports, or on covert operations. We have particularly in mind such communications as between the President and Khrushchev, etc. We believe that it is important for the DCI to see such messages in order to give proper guidance to the intelligence and operational activities of the Agency.

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